Traditional finite-field-based Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange during the TLS handshake suffers from a number of security, interoperability, and efficiency shortcomings. These shortcomings arise from lack of clarity about which DH group parameters TLS servers should offer and clients should accept. This document offers a solution to these shortcomings for compatible peers by using a section of the TLS "EC Named Curve Registry" to establish common finite-field DH parameters with known structure and a mechanism for peers to negotiate support for these groups. This draft updates TLS versions 1.0 [RFC2246], 1.1 [RFC4346], and 1.2 [RFC5246], as well as the TLS ECC extensions [RFC4492].
Traditional TLS [RFC5246] offers a Diffie-Hellman ephemeral (DHE) key exchange mode which provides Forward Secrecy for the connection. The client offers a ciphersuite in the ClientHello that includes DHE, and the server offers the client group parameters generator g and modulus p. If the client does not consider the group strong enough (e.g., if p is too small, or if p is not prime, or there are small subgroups that cannot be easily avoided), or if it is unable to process the group for other reasons, the client has no recourse but to terminate the connection.
Conversely, when a TLS server receives a suggestion for a DHE ciphersuite from a client, it has no way of knowing what kinds of DH groups the client is capable of handling, or what the client's security requirements are for this key exchange session. For example, some widely-distributed TLS clients are not capable of DH groups where p > 1024 bits. Other TLS clients may by policy wish to use DHE only if the server can offer a stronger group (and are willing to use a non-PFS key-exchange mechanism otherwise). The server has no way of knowing which type of client is connecting, but must select DH parameters with insufficient knowledge.
Additionally, the DH parameters selected by the server may have a known structure which renders them secure against a small subgroup attack, but a client receiving an arbitrary p and g has no efficient way to verify that the structure of a new group is reasonable for use.
This modification to TLS solves these problems by using a section of the "EC Named Curves" registry to select common DH groups with known structure and defining the use of the "elliptic_curves(10)" extension (described here as "Supported Groups" extension) for clients advertising support for DHE with these groups. This document also provides guidance for compatible peers to take advantage of the additional security, availability, and efficiency offered.
The use of this mechanism by one compatible peer when interacting with a non-compatible peer should have no detrimental effects.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
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Negotiated-FF-DHE-for-TLS June 2015 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] . The term "PRIVATE USE" is to be interpreted as described in [RFC5226] .
Vocabulary
The terms "DHE" or "FFDHE" are used in this document to refer to the finite-field-based Diffie-Hellman ephemeral key exchange mechanism in TLS. TLS also supports elliptic-curve-based Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) ephemeral key exchanges [RFC4492] , but this document does not document their use. A registry previously used only by ECHDE-capable implementations is expanded in this document to cover FFDHE groups as well. "FFDHE ciphersuites" is used in this document to refer exclusively to ciphersuites with FFDHE key exchange mechanisms, but note that these suites are typically labeled with a TLS_DHE_ prefix.
Named Group Overview
We use previously-unallocated codepoints within the extension currently known as "elliptic_curves" (section 5.1.1. of [RFC4492] ) to indicate known finite field groups. The extension's semantics are expanded from "Supported Elliptic Curves" to "Supported Groups". The semantics of the extension's data type (enum NamedCurve) is also expanded from "named curve" to "named group".
Additionally, we explicitly relax the requirement about when the Supported Groups extension can be sent. This extension MAY be sent by the client when either FFDHE or ECDHE ciphersuites are listed.
Codepoints in the NamedCurve registry with a high byte of 0x01 (that is, between 256 and 511 inclusive) are set aside for FFDHE groups, though only a small number of them are initially defined and we do not expect many other FFDHE groups to be added to this range. No codepoints outside of this range will be allocated to FFDHE groups. The new code points for the NamedCurve registry are: enum { // other already defined elliptic curves (see RFC 4492) ffdhe2048(256), ffdhe3072(257), ffdhe4096(258), ffdhe6144(259), ffdhe8192(260), // } NamedCurve;
These additions to the Named Curve registry are described in detail in Appendix A. They are all safe primes derived from the base of the natural logarithm ("e"), with the high and low 64 bits set to 1 for efficient Montgomery or Barrett reduction.
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The use of the base of the natural logarithm here is as a "nothingup-my-sleeve" number. The goal is to guarantee that the bits in the middle of the modulus are effectively random, while avoiding any suspicion that the primes have secretly been selected to be weak according to some secret criteria. [RFC3526] used pi for this value. See Section 9.5 for reasons that this draft does not reuse pi.
Client Behavior
A TLS client that is capable of using strong finite field Diffie-Hellman groups can advertise its capabilities and its preferences for stronger key exchange by using this mechanism.
The compatible client that wants to be able to negotiate strong FFDHE sends a "Supported Groups" extension (identified by type elliptic_curves(10) in [RFC4492] ) in the ClientHello, and include a list of known FFDHE groups in the extension data, ordered from most preferred to least preferred. If the client also supports and wants to offer ECDHE key exchange, it MUST use a single "Supported Groups" extension to include all supported groups (both ECDHE and FFDHE groups). The ordering SHOULD be based on client preference, but see Section 6.1 for more nuance.
A client that offers a "Supported Groups" extension containing an FFDHE group SHOULD also include at least one FFDHE ciphersuite in the Client Hello.
A client that offers a group MUST be able and willing to perform a DH key exchange using that group.
A client that offers one or more FFDHE groups in the "Supported Groups" extension and an FFDHE ciphersuite, and receives an FFDHE ciphersuite from the server SHOULD take the following steps upon receiving the ServerKeyExchange:
For If the client continues (either because the server offered a matching group, or because local policy permits the offered custom group), the client MUST verify that dh_Ys is in the range 1 < dh_Ys < dh_p -1. If dh_Ys is not in this range, the client MUST terminate the connection with a fatal handshake_failure(40) alert.
If dh_Ys is in range, then the client SHOULD continue with the connection as usual.
Client Local Policy on Custom Groups
Compatible clients that are willing to accept FFDHE ciphersuites from non-compatible servers may have local policy about what custom FFDHE groups they are willing to accept. This local policy presents a risk to clients, who may accept weakly-protected communications from misconfigured servers.
This draft cannot enumerate all possible safe local policy (the safest may be to simply reject all custom groups), but compatible clients that accept some custom groups from the server MUST do at least cursory checks on group size, and may take other properties into consideration as well.
A compatible client that accepts FFDHE ciphersuites using custom groups from non-compatible servers MUST reject any group with |dh_p| < 768 bits, and SHOULD reject any group with |dh_p| < 1024 bits.
A compatible client that rejects a non-compatible server's custom group may decide to retry the connection while omitting all FFDHE ciphersuites from the ClientHello. A client SHOULD only use this approach if it successfully verified the server's expected signature over the ServerDHParams, to avoid being forced by an active attacker into a non-preferred ciphersuite. If a non-anonymous FFDHE ciphersuite is selected, and the TLS client has used this extension to offer an FFDHE group of comparable or greater strength than the server's public key, the server SHOULD select an FFDHE group at least as strong as the server's public key. For example, if the server has a 3072-bit RSA key, and the client offers only ffdhe2048 and ffdhe4096, the server SHOULD select ffdhe4096.
When an FFDHE ciphersuite is selected, and the client sends a ClientKeyExchange, the server MUST verify that 1 < dh_Yc < dh_p -1. If dh_Yc is out of range, the server MUST terminate the connection with fatal handshake_failure(40) alert.
Optimizations
In a key exchange with a successfully negotiated known FFDHE group, both peers know that the group in question uses a safe prime as a modulus, and that the group in use is of size p-1 or (p-1)/2. This allows at least three optimizations that can be used to improve performance.
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Checking the Peer's Public Key
Peers MUST validate each other's public key Y (dh_Ys offered by the server or dh_Yc offered by the client) by ensuring that 1 < Y < p-1. This simple check ensures that the remote peer is properly behaved and isn't forcing the local system into the 2-element subgroup.
To reach the same assurance with an unknown group, the client would need to verify the primality of the modulus, learn the factors of p-1, and test both the generator g and Y against each factor to avoid small subgroup attacks.
Short Exponents
Traditional Finite Field Diffie-Hellman has each peer choose their secret exponent from the range [2,p-2]. Using exponentiation by squaring, this means each peer must do roughly 2*log_2(p) multiplications, twice (once for the generator and once for the peer's public key).
Peers concerned with performance may also prefer to choose their secret exponent from a smaller range, doing fewer multiplications, while retaining the same level of overall security. Each named group indicates its approximate security level, and provides a lower-bound on the range of secret exponents that should preserve it. For example, rather than doing 2*2*3072 multiplications for a ffdhe3072 handshake, each peer can choose to do 2*2*275 multiplications by choosing their secret exponent from the range [2^274,2^275] (that is, a m-bit integer where m is at least 275) and still keep the same approximate security level.
A similar short-exponent approach is suggested in SSH's Diffie-Hellman key exchange (See section 6.2 of [RFC4419]).
Table Acceleration
Peers wishing to further accelerate FFDHE key exchange can also precompute a table of powers of the generator of a known group. This is a memory vs. time tradeoff, and it only accelerates the first exponentiation of the ephemeral DH exchange (the fixed-base exponentiation). The variable-base exponentiation (using the peer's public exponent as a base) still needs to be calculated as normal.
Operational Considerations
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Preference Ordering
The ordering of named groups in the Supported Groups extension may contain some ECDHE groups and some FFDHE groups. These SHOULD be ranked in the order preferred by the client.
However, the ClientHello also contains list of desired ciphersuites, also ranked in preference order. This presents the possibility of conflicted preferences. For example, if the ClientHello contains a CipherSuite with two choices in order <TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA> and the Supported Groups Extension contains two choices in order <secp256r1,ffdhe3072> then there is a clear contradiction. Clients SHOULD NOT present such a contradiction since it does not represent a sensible ordering. A server that encounters such an contradiction when selecting between an ECDHE or FFDHE key exchange mechanism while trying to respect client preferences SHOULD give priority to the Supported Groups extension (in the example case, it should select TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA with secp256r1), but MAY resolve the contradiction any way it sees fit.
More subtly, clients MAY interleave preferences between ECDHE and FFDHE groups, for example if stronger groups are preferred regardless of cost, but weaker groups are acceptable, the Supported Groups extension could consist of: <ffdhe8192,secp384p1,ffdhe3072,secp256r1>. In this example, with the same CipherSuite offered as the previous example, a server configured to respect client preferences and with support for all listed groups SHOULD select TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA with ffdhe8192. A server configured to respect client preferences and with support for only secp384p1 and ffdhe3072 SHOULD select TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA with secp384p1. This document expands the semantics of this registry slightly, to include groups based on finite fields in addition to groups based on elliptic curves. IANA should add a range designation to that registry, indicating that values from 256-511 (inclusive) are set aside for "Finite Field Diffie-Hellman groups", and that all other entries in the registry are "Elliptic curve groups".
Acknowledgements
This document allocates five well-defined codepoints in the registry for specific Finite Field Diffie-Hellman groups defined in Appendix A.
In addition, the four highest codepoints in this range (508-511, inclusive) are designated for PRIVATE USE by peers who have privately-developed Finite Field Diffie-Hellman groups that they wish to signal internally.
The updated registry section should be as follows:
9. Security Considerations 9.1. Negotiation resistance to active attacks Because the contents of the Supported Groups extension are hashed in the finished message, an active MITM that tries to filter or omit groups will cause the handshake to fail, but possibly not before getting the peer to do something they would not otherwise have done.
An attacker who impersonates the server can try to do any of the following:
Pretend that a non-compatible server is actually capable of this extension, and select a group from the client's list, causing the client to select a group it is willing to negotiate. It is unclear how this would be an effective attack.
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Pretend that a compatible server is actually non-compatible by negotiating a non-FFDHE ciphersuite. This is no different than MITM ciphersuite filtering.
Pretend that a compatible server is actually non-compatible by negotiating a DHE ciphersuite, with a custom (perhaps weak) group selected by the attacker. This is no worse than the current scenario, and would require the attacker to be able to sign the ServerDHParams, which should not be possible without access to the server's secret key.
An attacker who impersonates the client can try to do the following:
Pretend that a compatible client is not compatible (e.g., by not offering the Supported Groups extension, or by replacing the Supported Groups extension with one that includes no FFDHE groups). This could cause the server to negotiate a weaker DHE group during the handshake, or to select a non-FFDHE ciphersuite, but it would fail to complete during the final check of the Finished message.
Pretend that a non-compatible client is compatible (e.g., by adding the Supported Groups extension, or by adding FFDHE groups to the extension). This could cause the server to select a particular named group in the ServerKeyExchange, or to avoid selecting an FFDHE ciphersuite. The peers would fail to compute the final check of the Finished message.
Change the list of groups offered by the client (e.g., by removing the stronger of the set of groups offered). This could cause the server to negotiate a weaker group than desired, but again should be caught by the check in the Finished message.
Group strength considerations
TLS implementations using FFDHE key exchange should consider the strength of the group they negotiate. The strength of the selected group is one of the factors that define the connection's resiliance against attacks on the session's confidentiality and integrity, since the session keys are derived from the DHE handshake.
While attacks on integrity must generally happen while the session is in progress, attacks against session confidentiality can happen significantly later, if the entire TLS session is stored for offline analysis. Therefore, FFDHE groups should be selected by clients and servers based on confidentiality guarantees they need. Sessions which need extremely long-term confidentiality should prefer stronger groups.
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Negotiated-FF-DHE-for-TLS June 2015 [ENISA] provides rough estimates of group resistance to attack, and recommends that forward-looking implementations ("future systems") should use FFDHE group sizes of at least 3072 bits. ffdhe3072 is intended for use in these implementations.
Other sources (e.g., [NIST] ) estimate the security levels of the DLOG problem to be slightly more difficult than [ENISA] . This document's suggested minimum exponent sizes in Appendix A for implementations that use the short exponents optimization (Section 5.2) are deliberately conservative to account for the range of these estimates.
Finite-Field DHE only
Note that this document specifically targets only finite field-based Diffie-Hellman ephemeral key exchange mechanisms. It does not cover the non-ephemeral DH key exchange mechanisms, nor does it address elliptic curve DHE (ECDHE) key exchange, which is defined in [RFC4492] .
Measured by computational cost to the TLS peers, ECDHE appears today to offer much a stronger key exchange mechanism than FFDHE.
Deprecating weak groups
Advances in hardware or in finite field cryptanalysis may cause some of the negotiated groups to not provide the desired security margins, as indicated by the estimated work factor of an adversary to discover the premaster secret (and may therefore compromise the confidentiality and integrity of the TLS session).
Revisions of this document should mark known-weak groups as explicitly deprecated for use in TLS, and should update the estimated work factor needed to break the group, if the cryptanalysis has changed. Implementations that require strong confidentiality and integrity guarantees should avoid using deprecated groups and should be updated when the estimated security margins are updated.
Choice of groups
Other lists of named finite field Diffie-Hellman groups [STRONGSWAN-IKE] exist. This draft chooses to not reuse them for several reasons:
Using the same groups in multiple protocols increases the value for an attacker with the resources to crack any single group.
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The IKE groups include weak groups like MODP768 which are unacceptable for secure TLS traffic.
Mixing group parameters across multiple implementations leaves open the possibility of some sort of cross-protocol attack. This shouldn't be relevant for ephemeral scenarios, and even with nonephemeral keying, services shouldn't share keys; however, using different groups avoids these failure modes entirely.
Timing attacks
Any implementation of finite field Diffie-Hellman key exchange should use constant-time modular-exponentiation implementations. This is particularly true for those implementations that ever re-use DHE secret keys (so-called "semi-static" ephemeral keying) or share DHE secret keys across a multiple machines (e.g., in a load-balancer situation).
Replay attacks from non-negotiated FFDHE
[SECURE-RESUMPTION], [CROSS-PROTOCOL], and [SSL3-ANALYSIS] all show a malicious peer using a bad FFDHE group to maneuver a client into selecting a pre-master secret of the peer's choice, which can be replayed to another server using a non-FFDHE key exchange, and can then be bootstrapped to replay client authentication.
To prevent this attack (barring the fixes proposed in [SESSION-HASH]), a client would need not only to implement this draft, but also to reject non-negotiated FFDHE ciphersuites whose group structure it cannot afford to verify. Such a client would need to abort the initial handshake and reconnect to the server in question without listing any FFDHE ciphersuites on the subsequent connection.
This tradeoff may be too costly for most TLS clients today, but may be a reasonable choice for clients performing client certificate authentication, or who have other reason to be concerned about server-controlled pre-master secrets.
Forward Secrecy
One of the main reasons to prefer FFDHE ciphersuites is Forward Secrecy, the ability to resist decryption even if when the endpoint's long-term secret key (usually RSA) is revealed in the future. FFDHE secret key material from memory as soon as it is no longer needed, and should never store it in persistent storage.
Forward secrecy also depends on the strength of the Diffie-Hellman group; using a very strong symmetric cipher like AES256 with a forward-secret ciphersuite, but generating the keys with a much weaker group like dhe2048 simply moves the adversary's cost from attacking the symmetric cipher to attacking the dh_Ys or dh_Yc ephemeral keyshares.
If the goal is to provide forward secrecy, attention should be paid to all parts of the ciphersuite selection process, both key exchange and symmetric cipher choice.
False Start
Clients capable of TLS False Start [FALSE-START] may receive a proposed FFDHE group from a server that is attacker-controlled. In particular, the attacker can modify the ClientHello to strip the proposed FFDHE groups, which may cause the server to offer a weaker FFDHE group than it should, and this will not be detected until receipt of the server's Finished message. This could cause a client using the False Start protocol modification to send data encrypted under a weak key agreement.
Clients should have their own classification of FFDHE groups that are "cryptographically strong" in the same sense described in the description of symmetric ciphers in [FALSE-START] , and SHOULD offer at least one of these in the initial handshake if they contemplate using the False Start protocol modification with an FFDHE ciphersuite.
Compatible clients performing a full handshake MUST NOT use the False Start protocol modification if the server selects an FFDHE ciphersuite but sends a group that is not cryptographically strong from the client's perspective.
Privacy Considerations

Client fingerprinting
This extension provides a few additional bits of information to distinguish between classes of TLS clients (see e.g. [PANOPTICLICK] ). To minimize this sort of fingerprinting, clients SHOULD support all named groups at or above their minimum security threshhold. New named groups SHOULD NOT be added to the registry without consideration of the cost of browser fingerprinting.
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Each description below indicates the group itself, its derivation, its expected strength (estimated roughly from guidelines in [ECRYPTII] ), and whether it is recommended for use in TLS key exchange at the given security level. It is not recommended to add further finite field groups to the NamedCurves registry; any attempt to do so should consider Section 10.1.
The primes in these finite field groups are all safe primes, that is, a prime p is a safe prime when q = (p-1)/2 is also prime. Where e is the base of the natural logarithm, and square brackets denote the floor operation, the groups which initially populate this registry are derived for a given bitlength b by finding the lowest positive integer X that creates a safe prime p where: p = 2^b -2^{b-64} + {[2^{b-130} e] + X } * 2^64 -1
New additions of FFDHE groups to this registry may use this same derivation (e.g., with different bitlengths) or may choose their parameters in a different way, but must be clear about how the parameters were derived.
New additions of FFDHE groups MUST use a safe prime as the modulus to enable the inexpensive peer verification described in Section 5.1.
A.1. ffdhe2048
The 2048-bit group has registry value 256, and is calculated from the following formula: 
The generator is: g = 2
The group size is: q = (p-1)/2
The hexadecimal representation of q is:
The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength of this group is 103 bits.
Peers using ffdhe2048 that want to optimize their key exchange with a short exponent (Section 5.2) should choose a secret key of at least 225 bits.
A.2. ffdhe3072
The 3072-bit prime has registry value 257, and is calculated from the following formula:
The modulus is: p = 2^3072 -2^3008 + {[2^2942 * e] + 2625351} * 2^64 -1
The hexadecimal representation of p is:
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The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength of this group is 125 bits.
Peers using ffdhe3072 that want to optimize their key exchange with a short exponent (Section 5.2) should choose a secret key of at least 275 bits.
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A.3. ffdhe4096
The 4096-bit group has registry value 258, and is calculated from the following formula:
The modulus is: p = 2^4096 -2^4032 + {[2^3966 * e] + 5736041} * 2^64 -1
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The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength of this group is 150 bits.
Peers using ffdhe4096 that want to optimize their key exchange with a short exponent (Section 5.2) should choose a secret key of at least 325 bits.
A.4. ffdhe6144
The 6144-bit group has registry value 259, and is calculated from the following formula: 
The hexadecimal representation of q is: 
The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength of this group is 175 bits.
Peers using ffdhe6144 that want to optimize their key exchange with a short exponent (Section 5.2) should choose a secret key of at least 375 bits.
A.5. ffdhe8192
The 8192-bit group has registry value 260, and is calculated from the following formula: The hexadecimal representation of p is: The group size is: q = (p-1)/2
